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1. Introduction
This paper discusses an experimental study on the expectations formation process and associ-
ated uncertainty within a macroeconomic framework. The importance of in￿ ation uncertainty
has been recognized at least since Friedman￿ s Nobel Lecture (Friedman, 1977). He argues that
higher rates of in￿ ation are associated with higher in￿ ation variability, which in turn causes a
reduction in the e¢ ciency of the price system and leads into the reduction of output due to
institutional rigidities. Levi and Makin (1980) and Mullineaux (1980) have found empirical sup-
port for the hypothesis that higher in￿ ation uncertainty is associated with lower output. This
represents a clear rationale why central banks should care about in￿ ation uncertainty. In￿ ation
targeting central banks in particular have recently increased their interest in the distribution of
in￿ ation expectations. They trust their communication strategies to play an important role in
the shaping of in￿ ationary expectations. Both individual uncertainty and disagreement (inter-
personal uncertainty) can therefore be viewed as a measure of the e⁄ectiveness of central banks￿
communication strategies. With some central banks these strategies also include publishing
their probabilistic forecasts of in￿ ation in terms of fan charts. More generally, credibility of in-
￿ ation targets can be assessed using both the point forecast and agents￿perceived uncertainty.
As Giordani and S￿derlind (2003) demonstrate this is particularly relevant when there is a
regime switch.1 In his speech about Federal Reserve communications, Mishkin (2008) stresses
that the cost of in￿ ation should be viewed both in terms of levels and of its uncertainty. This
claim is actually consistent with the standard New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) model, where it has been shown that in order to maximize consumer welfare
the central bank should minimize variation of in￿ ation (see e.g. Woodford, 2003).2
In our experiment subjects are introduced to ￿ctitious economy described with series of
in￿ ation, interest rates and output gap. They are asked to forecast in￿ ation and to provide
95% con￿dence intervals around their point forecasts. These forecasts are then fed into the
simpli￿ed version of the New Keynesian model which gives us the realized values of in￿ ation,
output gap and interest rates. These values are displayed to the subject and the process is
iterated. This allows us to study the individual uncertainty about forecasts as well as the
disagreement on the point forecasts.3 We compare our results to those in the survey data
literature aimed at distinguishing between uncertainty and disagreement and evaluating their
relation to in￿ ation variability.
We study the determinants of di⁄erent measures of in￿ ation uncertainty proposed in the
literatures and evaluate which measure should be used as a proxy of in￿ ation variance. We
also focus on the relationship between monetary policy and in￿ ation uncertainty and examine
whether some environments are better then others at stabilizing both in￿ ation and its uncer-
1See also Evans and Wachtel (1993).
2Recognizing the importance of di⁄erent aspects of expectations distribution Lorenzoni (2010) shows that
monetary policy a⁄ects agents (with di⁄erent pieces of information) di⁄erently, arguing that there is a trade-o⁄
between aggregate and cross-sectional e¢ ciency.
3Our companion paper (Pfajfar and ￿ Zakelj, 2011) focuses on the in￿ ation expectation formation mechanism
and its relation to monetary policy, i.e. how should the monetary policy be designed in order to be robust for
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tainty. We study two di⁄erent monetary policy rules: in￿ ation targeting and in￿ ation forecast
targeting. For the latter we use three di⁄erent speci￿cations of the coe¢ cient that describes
the reaction of interest rates to the deviations of in￿ ation forecasts from the in￿ ation target.
We ￿nd that the design signi￿cantly a⁄ects both the width and the accuracy of forecast inter-
vals. In particular, we ￿nd that the instrumental rule that reacts to current in￿ ation reduces
overall uncertainty and increases subjects￿forecast accuracy compared to the rules that react to
expected in￿ ation. Most of these di⁄erences can be attributed to the fact that the contempo-
raneous rule (in￿ ation targeting) produces lower variability of actual in￿ ation. However there
are some treatment e⁄ects that go beyond the interest rate channel. Similar evidence is also
observed for the treatment where the central bank reacts more strongly to the deviations of
in￿ ation expectations from in￿ ation target.
Results on the analysis of the behavior of individual con￿dence intervals suggest that the
width of con￿dence interval is highly inertial and it increases when in￿ ation is below the target
level. This contrasts the results of the survey data literature, where it is a high in￿ ation that
usually leads to an increase in uncertainty. However, our results show little evidence of di⁄erent
degrees of uncertainty in di⁄erent phases of the business cycle.
Which representation of in￿ ation expectations is most relevant for monetary authority?
The forecast ability of di⁄erent measures has been mostly examined using the survey data of
professional forecasters.4 Three measures have been predominantly used in the survey data
literature: standard deviation of point forecasts, average individual forecast error variance, and
the variance of the aggregate distribution. They are complementary in terms of informative
value. The ￿rst measure describes disagreement but says little about uncertainty and the
second captures uncertainty but disregards the disagreement. Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987)
show that there can be substantial di⁄erences between the variation of disagreement and the
variation of uncertainty. Variance of the aggregate distribution of forecasts gives information
about both, uncertainty and disagreement; however it is di¢ cult to separate the two e⁄ects.
In our setup we can compare di⁄erent measures obtained from the individual responses and
the aggregate distribution and study their ability to forecast in￿ ation variability. We ￿nd that
average con￿dence intervals perform best in the forecasting exercise, although simple correlation
analysis shows that the interquartile range of the aggregate distribution (IQR) is a measure
that has the highest correlations with the variability of in￿ ation.
Several dynamic panel data regressions are designed to identify the determinants of three
measures discussed above. Disagreement among subjects measured with standard deviation of
point forecasts increases when average group forecast error increases and when in￿ ation is below
the target level. Similar explanatory variables also a⁄ect the individual uncertainty although
disagreement is arguably less inertial. All factors that enter signi￿cantly to the speci￿cation
for uncertainty and disagreement are by de￿nition also important for the interquartile range.
4See Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) and Giordani and S￿derlind (2003) for example. One disadvantage
of survey data is that panel members do not always provide their forecast and also the panel pool changes
continously. See Engelberg, Manski, and Williams (2009) for some other methodological issues involved. A
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Indeed, in￿ ation, mean forecast error and lagged interquartile range exert signi￿cant e⁄ects.
When looking at individual responses we also ￿nd that forecasters usually tend to under-
estimate the underlying uncertainty when forecasting in￿ ation as only 60% of realization falls
within the speci￿ed 95% interval. Giordani and S￿derlind (2003) reach similar conclusions when
analyzing the survey data of professional forecasters. An observation that subjects tend to re-
port narrower con￿dence intervals than the one asked for is a well-known fact, labelled as the
"overcon￿dence e⁄ect." This issue has been extensively debated in the experimental psychology
literature. A common approach in the latter literature is to frame the experiment in the context
of stock market forecasting exercises.5
D￿ Amico and Orphanides (2008), Giordani and S￿derlind (2003) and Rich and Tracy (2003)
all argue that the observed con￿dence intervals of forecasters in the survey data are usually
symmetric. Also studies in psychological literature usually assume symmetric con￿dence inter-
vals (see O￿ Connor, Remus, and Griggs, 2001 for a discussion). Symmetric intervals are easier
to handle in empirical analysis when we want to construct the aggregate distribution of expec-
tations, because we can simply assume that individual￿ s distribution is normally distributed.
Furthermore there are no theoretical reasons in our model why con￿dence intervals should not
be symmetric, as the underlying model and the distribution of shocks do not exhibit any asym-
metries. In the ￿eld data, this might not necessarily be the case as there are several documented
potential asymmetries, especially asymmetric monetary policy e⁄ects over the business cycle.
We have decided to perform treatment A with the restriction to symmetric con￿dence intervals
while in treatment B we test this assumption and allow subjects to have potentially asymmetric
intervals.6 However, only 12:5% of con￿dence intervals are symmetric when we allow subjects
to report asymmetric con￿dence intervals. Du and Budescu (2007) and O￿ Connor, Remus, and
Griggs (2001) also point out that con￿dence intervals tend to be asymmetric. Du and Budescu
(2007) explain the use of asymmetry with the hedging e⁄ect, where subjects tend to provide
slightly more optimistic point forecasts and hedge for this risk by inserting skewed con￿dence
intervals. They also ￿nd a negative relationship between asymmetric con￿dence intervals and
the volatility of the underlying series. Our results suggest that there is less asymmetry when
there is an upward path of output gap (expansion) and when in￿ ation is below the target level.
Experimental economic research on forecasting uncertainty has been less abundant than
survey based research. Fehr and Tyran (2008) ask the subjects to provide descriptive measures
of their con￿dence level (but do not perform any analysis on it), while we ask subjects to
provide numerical responses. Similarly Bottazzi and Devetag (2005) ask subjects to provide
95% con￿dence intervals in an asset pricing experiment, with the aim (almost exclusively) of
de￿ning average forecast and not of studying the behavior of uncertainty or disagreement.7
5For surveys, see Ho⁄rage (2004) or Lichtenstein, Fischho⁄, and Phillips (1982) (see also e.g. Oskamp, 1965,
Lawrence and O￿ Connor, 1992, Muradoglu and Onkal, 1994, Gilovich, Gri¢ n, and Kahneman, 2002). These
studies usually do not provide payment for the accuracy or the width of the con￿dence intervals, only for the
accuracy of the point forecasts.
6Engelberg, Manski, and Williams (2009) documents another potential asymmetry in the forecasting process
(on which we do not focus), i.e. asymmetry between central tendencies of subjective distributions and point
forecasts.
7Bottazzi, Devetag, and Pancotto (2010) argue that asking for the con￿dence intervals instead of point predic-Uncertainty and Disagreement in Forecasting Inflation 5
Our focus is also quite di⁄erent to that of psychology experiments. These usually limit their
attention to independent event forecasts, while the present study concentrates on a series of
(dependant) forecasts. This allows us to perform time-series analysis of con￿dence bounds. We
also provide subjects with other relevant information (besides the past history of prices) that
might in￿ uence con￿dence. In this way we are able to examine whether con￿dence intervals are
a⁄ected by stages of the business cycle.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model and the experimental
design; in Section 3 we focus on the analysis of individual responses while in Section 4 we
analyze disagreement and properties of aggregate distribution; Section 5 discusses and assesses
the forecasting ability of di⁄erent measures, while Section 6 concludes.
2. Experimental Design
We design an experiment where subjects participate in a ￿ctitious economy and are asked to
provide in￿ ation forecasts and a measure of uncertainty about their forecasts. The mean of
point forecast is then used by the data generating process for calculating in￿ ation, interest rate,
and output gap. These variables are available to subjects before the next period forecast. These,
so-called "learning to forecast" experiments have been conducted before within a simple macro-
economic setup (e.g. Williams, 1987; Marimon, Spear, and Sunder, 1993; Evans, Honkapohja,
and Marimon, 2001; Arifovic and Sargent, 2003; Adam, 2007) and also within the asset pric-
ing framework (see Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and van de Velden, 2005 and Anufriev and
Hommes, 2007). Closest to our framework, but with a di⁄erent focus, are experiments by Adam
(2007) and Assenza, Heemeijer, Hommes, and Massaro (2011). In this paper we decided to focus
on the reduced form of the New Keynesian (NK) model, where we can clearly observe forecasts
and study their relationship with monetary policy. Of course, there is a trade-o⁄ between using
the model from "￿rst principles" and employing a reduced form. The former has the advantage
of setting the objectives (payo⁄ function) exactly in line with microfoundations, however fore-
casts are di¢ cult to elicit in this environment where subjects act as producers and consumers
and interact on labor and ￿nal product markets and do not explicitly provide their forecasts
(for the latter approach, see Noussair, Pfajfar, and Zsiros, 2011). Therefore, an appropriate
framework for the question that we address in this paper is the "learning to forecast" design
where incentives are set in order to induce the most accurate forecasts as possible.8 We ￿rst
present the model and then focus on the design.
Data generating process is forward-looking sticky price NK monetary model with di⁄erent
monetary policy reaction functions.9 The baseline framework in the NK approach is a dy-
tions in asset pricing framework has the e⁄ect of reducing price ￿ uctuations and increasing subjects￿coordination
on a common prediction strategy.
8In this framework, thus, we do not assign subjects a particular role in the economy, rather they act as "profes-
sional" forecasters. One way to think about the relation between "professional forecasters" and consumers/￿rms
is that these economic subjects employ professional forecasters to provide them with forecasts of in￿ ation.
9The advantage of this small-scale NK model is that it reproduces relatively well several stylized facts about
major economies and is the simplest model that is widely used for policy analysis by central banks and govern-
ments. However, there are two implicit complications for participants. First, it requires forecasting two periods
ahead. It would de￿nitely be easier for participants to produce a one period ahead forecast (sometimes called
"nowcasting"). The second drawback is that the standard forward-looking NK models assume that agents have6 D. Pfajfar and B. ￿ Zakelj
namic stochastic general equilibrium model with money, nominal price rigidities, and rational
expectations. The model consists of a forward-looking Phillips curve (PC), an IS curve, and
a monetary policy reaction function.10 The information set at the time of forecasting consists
of macro variables at the time t ￿ 1, although the forecasts are made in period t for period
t + 1. Mathematically we denote this as Et￿t+1. Strictly speaking, it should be denoted as
Et (￿t+1jIt￿1). In the experiment we replace Et￿t+1 by 1
K
Pk ￿k
t+1jt , where ￿k
t+1jt is k-subject￿
point forecast of in￿ ation (K is total number of subjects in an economy).
The IS curve is speci￿ed as follows:
yt = ￿’(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + yt￿1 + gt; (1)
where interest rate is it, ￿t denotes in￿ ation, yt is output gap, and gt is an exogenous shock.
The parameter ’ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in demand. We calibrate it to
0:164.11 We can observe that we do not have expectations of output gap in the speci￿cation.
Instead, we have lagged output gap.12 Compared to purely forward-looking speci￿cations, our
model might display more persistence in the output gap. This is the most signi￿cant departure
from the otherwise standard macroeconomic model.
Aggregating across the price setting decisions of individual ￿rms yields the linear relationship
in the equation (2). Thus, the supply side of the economy is summarized in the following PC:
￿t = ￿yt + ￿Et￿t+1 + ut: (2)
The longer prices are ￿xed on average, i.e. the smaller is ￿, the less sensitive in￿ ation is
to the current output gap. The parameter ￿ is the subjective discount rate. According to
McCallum and Nelson (2004) calibration, we set ￿ = 0:3 and ￿ = 0:99: The shocks gt and ut
are uncorrelated and unobservable to subjects and follow an AR(1) process:
gt = ￿gt￿1 + e gt;
ut = ￿ut￿1 + e ut;










. In the NK literature it is standard to assume AR(1) shocks. gt could
be justi￿ed as government spending shock or taste shocks and standard interpretation of ut is
the technology shock. Empirical literature ￿nds these shocks to be quite persistent (see e.g.
to forecast both in￿ ation and output gap. We decided to simplify this experiment by asking only for expectations
of in￿ ation.
10Detailed derivations are in, for example, Woodford (1996), or textbooks such as Walsh (2003) or Woodford
(2003).
11We implement McCallum and Nelson (2004) calibration, which is one of the standard calibrations for NK
models.
12In principle, one could argue that this speci￿cation of IS equation corresponds to the case when subjects have
naive expectations on output gap or it is assumed extreme case of habit persistence. We do not ask subjects to
forecast both in￿ ation and output gap. We were afraid that this would represent a too di¢ cult task for them
(also as they have to forecast for two periods ahead). We leave the fully forward-looking NK model for future
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Cooley and Prescott, 1995 or Ireland, 2004). In particular, ￿ and ￿ are calibrated to 0:6, while
their standard deviations are 0:08: The treatments are fully comparable as we have exactly
the same shocks in all treatments. The introduction of shocks as an exogenous unobservable
component in the law of motion for observable variables is an important source of uncertainty in
our experiment. It helps to avoid outcomes where all agents would coordinate on the forecasts
identical to the in￿ ation target and maintains the focus on the process of learning to forecast.
To close the model, the interest rate rule has to be speci￿ed. We use two alternative
monetary policy reaction functions in di⁄erent experimental treatments: (i) in￿ ation forecast
targeting where the interest rate is set in response to in￿ ation expectations; we study three
di⁄erent parametrizations of this rule, and (ii) instrumental rule where interest rates are set in
response to current in￿ ation ￿in￿ ation targeting.
We start with the following in￿ ation forecast targeting rule:
it = ￿ (Et￿t+1 ￿ ￿) + ￿: (3)
Here the central bank responds to deviations of in￿ ation from the target, ￿. We vary ￿ in
di⁄erent treatments. In order to have in￿ ation in positive numbers for most of the periods we
set the in￿ ation target to ￿ = 3.
The alternative that we study is in￿ ation targeting. Here contemporaneous rather than
forecasted in￿ ation is encompassed in the monetary policy rule:
it = ￿ (￿t ￿ ￿) + ￿: (4)
There are two distinct treatments, A and B, to analyze the formation of con￿dence intervals.
In treatment A we restrict ourselves to symmetric con￿dence intervals. Subjects insert the
di⁄erence from their point forecast which is roughly equivalent to 1:96 standard errors of their
expectation, assuming it is represented by a normal distribution. This is relaxed in treatment
B, where subjects have to report the upper and the lower bound of their forecast together
with their mean forecast, so that we do not require individuals to report symmetric con￿dence
intervals (in both treatments we ask them to report 95% con￿dence intervals). As explained
above, there are also four treatments which use di⁄erent speci￿cations of the monetary policy
reaction function. The summary is provided in the Table 1.
The ￿rst three treatments, deal with the parametrization of the in￿ ation forecast targeting
given in equation (3). In this setup, the slope coe¢ cient ￿ determines the central bank￿ s aggres-
siveness in response to deviations of in￿ ation (or in￿ ation expectations) from its target. Higher
￿ implies stronger stabilizing e⁄ect of the Taylor-type monetary policy rule. The majority of
empirical ￿ndings in the literature agree that the magnitude of the slope coe¢ cient is around
1:5. Our key interest is in seeing how subjects react to more and less aggressive interest rate
policies and how polices in￿ uence the uncertainty of their forecasts (see Section 3). Detailed
discussion on the treatment selection regarding monetary policy can be found in our companion8 D. Pfajfar and B. ￿ Zakelj
Treatment A Treatment B
Subtreatments Symmetric Asymmetric
con￿dence interval con￿dence bounds
Taylor rule (equation) Parameters Groups Groups
1 ￿Forward looking (3) ￿ = 1:5 1-4 5-6
2 ￿Forward looking (3) ￿ = 1:35 7-10 11-12
3 ￿Forward looking (3) ￿ = 4 13-16 17-18
4 ￿Contemporaneous (4) ￿ = 1:5 19-22 23-24
Table 1: Treatments
paper (Pfajfar and ￿ Zakelj, 2011) where we focus on questions regarding the performance of
di⁄erent monetary policy rules and their impact on expectations (point forecasts).
2.1. Experimental procedures. Experimental subjects participate in a simulated econ-
omy of 9 agents.13 Each session of a treatment has 2 independent groups ("economies"), there-
fore 18 subjects participate in each session. Participants are enlisted through a recruitment
program for undergraduate students at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra and the University of
Tilburg. The experiment consists of 12 sessions each containing 2 independent groups, thus 24
groups in total. Participants remain in the same group throughout the experiment. They earn
on average around e15, depending on the treatment and individual performance. Participants
receive detailed instructions (here attached in Appendix C), a quiz questionnaire and play 5
practice rounds before the start of the experiment to make sure they fully understand their
task. The program is written in Z-Tree experimental software (Fischbacher, 2007).
Subjects are presented with a simple ￿ctitious economy setup. As shown above, the econ-
omy is described with three macroeconomic variables: in￿ ation, output gap and interest rate.
Participants observe time series of these variables and their past forecasts, up to the period t￿1.
They do not observe the forecasts of other individuals and their performance. 10 initial values
are generated by the computer under the assumption of rational expectations. The subjects￿
task is to provide in￿ ation forecasts for the period t + 1 and 95% con￿dence interval. The un-
derlying model of the economy is qualitatively described to them. We explain the meaning and
relevance between the main macroeconomic variables and inform them that their decisions have
an impact on the realized output, in￿ ation and interest rate in time t. This is a predominant
strategy in the learning to forecast experiments (see Du⁄y, 2008, and Hommes, 2011).14 Each
13The common view among the experimental economists is that we do not need many subjects in the micro-
founded experiments. Most of the learning to forecast experiments are conducted with 5-6 subjects, e.g. Hommes,
Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and van de Velden (2005), Adam (2007), Fehr and Tyran (2008).
14In learning to forecast experiments it is not possible to achieve REE (Rational Expectations Equilibrium)
simply by introspection. This holds even if we provide subjects with the data generating process as there exists
uncertainty how other participants forecast, so subjects have to engage in a number of trial and error exercises
or in other words adaptive learning. It has been analytically proven in Marcet and Sargent (1989) and further
formalized in a series of papers by Evans and Honkapohja (see their book: Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) that
it is enough that agents observe all relevant variables in the economy (as in our case, where they are speci￿cally
instructed that all of them might be relevant) and update their forecasts according to the adaptive learning
algorithm (their errors) they will end up in the REE. This has been acknowledged also in Du⁄y (2008) and
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session consists of 70 periods.
After each period subjects receive information about realized in￿ ation in that period, their
prediction of it, and the payo⁄ they have gained. The payo⁄ function is a sum of two convex
components. The ￿rst component depends on their forecast errors, while the second depends
on the width of their con￿dence interval.


























The ￿rst component, W1 is designed to encourage subjects to give accurate point forecasts.
It depends on their forecast errors and is designed to encourage subjects to give accurate pre-
dictions. It gives subjects a payo⁄ if their forecast errors, f, are smaller than 4. The second
component, W2, depends on the width of their con￿dence interval and intends to motivate
subjects to think about the variance of actual in￿ ation since it is more rewarding when it is
narrower. It exhibits a trade-o⁄ between the width of this interval and its accuracy. A similar
functional form of the payo⁄ function is used in Adam (2007). CI is either equal to their point
estimate of con￿dence interval or half of the di⁄erence between upper and lower bound. Sub-
jects receive a reward if their con￿dence intervals, CI, are not larger than ￿4 percentage points,






this setup we restrict to positive payo⁄s.
We performed several simulations regarding the incentive compatibility of the part of the
payo⁄ function that addresses con￿dence bounds. Desirable payo⁄ functions have to exhibit
a trade-o⁄ between the width of the interval and the accuracy of the interval, which makes it
di¢ cult to specify and calibrate incentive compatible payo⁄ function. Assuming all agents are
rational (and they know that all others are rational) then the function chosen gives a maximum
payo⁄ when 96:5% con￿dence intervals are taken into account. When not all subjects are
rational there are two e⁄ects on their con￿dence intervals: (i) forecast accuracy decreases and
the required 95% con￿dence interval widens; (ii) the payo⁄function is maximized with narrower
con￿dence intervals than 96:5%.15 Maximizing the objective function under nonrational agents
requires several assumptions regarding the perceived law of motion of both point forecasts and
con￿dence intervals since optimal con￿dence intervals are not necessarily constant as in the
case of rational agents. Therefore the only natural benchmark is rational expectations and we
15This is also supported with previous evidence in the literature. Pfajfar and ￿ Zakelj (2011) show that in this
experiment nonrational forecast results in more variability of in￿ ation. Du and Budescu (2007) demonstrate that
higher variability of the underlying series is associated with greater overcon￿dence (narrower intervals).10 D. Pfajfar and B. ￿ Zakelj
decided to formulate the question in terms of 95% con￿dence intervals.
3. Individual Uncertainty
While the distribution of means across subjects captures only interpersonal variation, individual
con￿dence bounds help us to approximate individual uncertainty of future in￿ ation. Zarnowitz
and Lambros (1987) claim that interpersonal variation is an appropriate measure of disagree-
ment among forecasters while uncertainty can be described as intrapersonal variation. Their
study shows that there can be substantial di⁄erences between the variation of disagreement
and variation of uncertainty, therefore both might not be appropriate measures for forecasting
variability of in￿ ation. Our experimental design allows us to analyze both features of the distri-
bution of responses. The current section concentrates on individual uncertainty, while the next
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Figure 1: Histogram of con￿dence intervals for all treatments, subjects and periods
Figure 1 displays the distribution of all con￿dence interval forecasts. The range of responses
for con￿dence intervals is between 0 and 8:3, although it should be noted that responses larger
than 4 do not result in any payo⁄.16 The average symmetrical con￿dence interval is 0:61 with
an average standard deviation of 0:28. Introducing asymmetrical con￿dence bounds across all
treatments gives us an average lower con￿dence interval of 0:37 with an average standard devi-
ation of 0:19 while the average upper con￿dence interval equals 0:41 with an average standard
deviation of 0:28. There are considerable di⁄erences across treatments as the lowest symmet-
rical (asymmetrical lower, upper) average interval in treatment A (treatment B) is 0:41 (0:24,
0:27) and the highest is 0:91 (0:47, 0:53). Evidence of rounding is present in responses 0:5,
1, 1:5, 2, and 3 as they have signi￿cantly higher frequencies than other responses. Overall,
13% of responses are integers, while the majority are to one decimal point accuracy, 77%. The
remaining responses are to 2 decimal point accuracy. Rounding of the inputs for con￿dence
intervals (probabilistic forecasts) has been previously documented by D￿ Amico and Orphanides
(2008) and Engelberg, Manski, and Williams (2009).
16The overall share of responses greater than 4 is 0:98%.Uncertainty and Disagreement in Forecasting Inflation 11
Average con￿dence interval All Treat. A Treat. B
(symmetric) (asymmetric)
1 ￿Forward looking (3), ￿ = 1:5 0.564 0.669 0.352
2 ￿Forward looking (3), ￿ = 1:35 0.776 0.914 0.500
3 ￿Forward looking (3), ￿ = 4 0.395 0.466 0.254
4 ￿Contemporaneous (4), ￿ = 1:5 0.430 0.410 0.471
Table 2: Width of con￿dence intervals across treatments. Note: The width of asymmetric
con￿dence interval is calculated as (Upper b. - Lower b.)/2.
The average con￿dence intervals in each treatment are listed in Table 2, while per-group
summary is presented in Table 3. In general, con￿dence intervals are narrower in treatment B
than in treatment A at 1% signi￿cance using nonparametric tests (Wilcoxon/ Mann-Whitney).
In Section 3.1 we show that treatments A and B also di⁄er in forecast accuracy of subjects￿
interval predictions. The factors that determine the di⁄erences in con￿dence intervals are
discussed in Section 3.2.
We also have the opportunity to compare the results with the underlying uncertainty that
we have embedded in our set-up. Under the assumption that all agents use rational expectations
in all periods, a rational agent would set her con￿dence interval of 0:2046 for treatments 1-3
and 0:2081 for treatment 4.17 Of course, as soon as one subject departs from rationality, the
con￿dence interval of a rational agent should immediately become larger as she has to account
for the uncertainty of other subjects￿expectations. Under rational expectations in treatments
1-3 the uncertainty should not be a⁄ected by the ￿; while in treatment 4 it depends on ￿; higher
￿ leads to lower uncertainty.
As outlined above, uncertainty should be slightly lower when the central bank is pursuing
in￿ ation forecast targeting compared to in￿ ation targeting. Contrary to that, we ￿nd that the
average con￿dence interval is narrower in treatment 4 compared to the other treatments. The
average con￿dence interval is indeed narrower in treatment 4 compared to other treatments.
This di⁄erence is statistically signi￿cant with standard parametric (t-test) and nonparametric
tests (Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney). However, if we compare treatment 4 separately to all other
treatments, we can observe that while it is signi￿cantly narrower than treatments 1 and 2 it
is wider than treatment 3. The theory suggests that in treatments 1-3 all con￿dence intervals
should have the same width; however this is strongly rejected with our experimental data. We
can conclude that the monetary policy signi￿cantly a⁄ects the width of the con￿dence interval.
In￿ ation targeting results in a narrower con￿dence interval than in￿ ation forecast targeting.
Furthermore, in the case of in￿ ation forecast targeting, the width of the con￿dence interval
also depends on how strongly the monetary policy is reacting to deviations of in￿ ation from its
17Unconditional variances of the residuals following AR(1) process are vrg =
￿2
g




con￿dence interval for treatments 1-3 is therefore 1:96 ￿
p
vrg + ￿









vru = 0:2081.12 D. Pfajfar and B. ￿ Zakelj
target.18
In￿ ation Con￿dence bound
Symmetric Lower Upper
Treat. Group mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev
1-A 1 2.85 5.87 0.97 0.71 - - - -
1-A 2 2.88 2.91 0.65 0.40 - - - -
1-A 3 2.92 1.97 0.70 0.35 - - - -
1-A 4 3.00 0.76 0.34 0.16 - - - -
1-B 5 3.13 1.10 - - 0.36 0.19 0.41 0.24
1-B 6 3.12 0.90 - - 0.29 0.14 0.35 0.41
2-A 7 3.12 0.76 1.09 0.30 - - - -
2-A 8 3.09 1.82 1.15 0.63 - - - -
2-A 9 3.13 0.51 0.38 0.21 - - - -
2-A 10 3.02 5.53 1.02 0.56 - - - -
2-B 11 2.52 3.58 - - 0.61 0.45 0.72 0.43
2-B 12 3.03 0.88 - - 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.14
3-A 13 3.01 0.52 0.53 0.13 - - - -
3-A 14 3.02 0.94 0.65 0.32 - - - -
3-A 15 2.99 0.24 0.35 0.09 - - - -
3-A 16 3.00 0.26 0.33 0.10 - - - -
3-B 17 2.99 0.31 - - 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.10
3-B 18 3.01 0.24 - - 0.20 0.08 0.25 0.35
4-A 19 3.09 0.39 0.36 0.13 - - - -
4-A 20 3.23 0.81 0.56 0.20 - - - -
4-A 21 3.05 0.48 0.38 0.09 - - - -
4-A 22 3.05 0.38 0.34 0.10 - - - -
4-B 23 3.09 0.52 - - 0.31 0.12 0.31 0.15
4-B 24 3.11 1.29 - - 0.60 0.28 0.65 0.37
All-A 3.03 1.51 0.61 0.28 - - - -
All-B 3.00 1.10 - - 0.37 0.18 0.41 0.28
Table 3: Con￿dence bounds, summary statistics.
Our results might not be directly comparable to those based on surveys. Probabilistic
forecasts in surveys are usually collected in terms of histograms where intervals are prede￿ned
and ￿xed for all participants. Another di⁄erence between our experiment and surveys concerns
the risk attitude. With professional forecasters it can be claimed that their probability and
point forecasts are correlated because they interact and in￿ uence each other.19 Zarnowitz and
Lambros (1987) argue that risk averse forecasters tend to make their forecasts as close to the
relevant value as possible, and this holds for point forecasts and probabilistic forecasts. In our
experiment, subjects could neither exchange information about each other￿ s expectations, nor
is the average aggregate prediction directly observable.
18This relationship is further analyzed in Section 3.2.
19Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Banerjee (1992) and Zwiebel (1995) argue that forecasters are occasionally
afraid to deviate from the majority or the consensus opinion. Pons-Novell (2003) provides empirical evidence on
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3.1. Forecasting Accuracy. In this section we ￿rst establish some stylized facts about
forecasting performance and then we focus on establishing which factors a⁄ect the probability
that the actual in￿ ation falls within the speci￿ed bounds.
It is interesting to see how accurate experimental subjects are in determining the con￿dence
bounds. Thaler (2000) suggests that when people are asked "for their 90% con￿dence limits ...
the correct answers will lie within the limits less than 70% of the time" (p. 133). Giordani and
S￿derlind (2003) get a very similar result (72%).20 Our results con￿rm the overcon￿dence e⁄ect
in an even stronger manner than survey data results. Only 60:5% of the times subjects manage
to set con￿dence bounds that include actual in￿ ation in the next period.21 This proportion
is higher in treatment A where 64:3% correctly specify con￿dence intervals while in treatment
B the proportion is only 52:8%. It is interesting to note that the actual in￿ ation is lower
than their con￿dence intervals in 19% of cases while it is higher in 20:5%. If we compare this
among treatments we ￿nd that in treatment A (B) actual in￿ ation is lower than their con￿dence
intervals in 17:1% (22:9%) of cases while it is higher in 18:5% (24:4%). As we mentioned in the
introduction this overcon￿dence e⁄ect has attracted a lot of attention in psychology literature.
Some studies even document that the success rate of these forecasts is less than 50% when
people are asked for 90 ￿ 99% con￿dence intervals (e.g. Lichtenstein, Fischho⁄, and Phillips,
1982).22 The most striking example of this bias has been recently documented by Ben-David,
Graham, and Harvey (2010) who assembled a panel of forecasts by top ￿nancial executives.
They show that the realized market returns are only 33% of the time within 80% con￿dence
bounds. They put forward two possible explanations for these results: (i) CEOs overestimate
their ability to predict the future or (ii) they underestimate the volatility of random events.
Moreover, Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005) argue that traders who underestimate
risk are prone to the winner￿ s curse.23
The accuracy of con￿dence intervals di⁄ers also across di⁄erent monetary policies. We ￿nd
that in treatment 3 and 4, subjects are more accurate (62:9% and 69:4% accuracy respectively)
than in the benchmark treatment 1 (51:7% accuracy). Di⁄erences are signi￿cantly at a 10%
level with Wilcoxon/ Mann-Whitney test.
As con￿dence intervals forecast the distribution of the expected forecast errors we can actu-
ally dig deeper and analyze each individual separately. We ￿nd that only 11:1% of the subjects
on average overestimate risk in treatment A and 2:8% (1:4%) of the subjects in treatment B
for lower (upper) bound. Closer inspection allows us to conclude that only about 9:0% of the
subjects in treatment A and 1:4% (8:4%) of the subjects in treatment B for lower (upper) bound
on average report the con￿dence bounds that are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent than 95% con￿dence
intervals based on actual forecast errors. The rest of subjects on average forecast con￿dence
bounds that are signi￿cantly lower than the actual forecast errors. Per-group statistics are
20See also Giordani and S￿derlind (2006).
21Moreover, our instructions required subjects to introduce their prediction with 95 con￿dence bounds.
22Onkal and Bolger (2004) and Du and Budescu (2007) document that the overcon￿dece e⁄ect weakens when
subjects are asked for 70 or 50% con￿dence intervals.
23Yaniv and Foster (1995) argue that overcon￿dence can be explained by the fact that the subjects are worried
that inserting too narrow con￿dence intervals will reduce the informativeness of their inputs.14 D. Pfajfar and B. ￿ Zakelj
reported in Table A1 in Appendix A.
We check how volatility of in￿ ation, the width of con￿dence bounds, and macroeconomic
variables a⁄ect the likelihood of in￿ ation falling within the speci￿ed con￿dence bound.24 We
estimate the following regression:
xk
t = ￿k + ￿sipk
tjt￿1 + ￿D1yt￿1 + ￿D2yt￿1 + ￿D3yt￿1 + (5)





t takes the value 1 when in￿ ation falls within the provided bounds and 0 otherwise,
sipk
tjt￿1 is subject k￿ s interval prediction for period t (for treatment B it is (Upper b. - Lower
b.)/2), yt is output gap, ￿t is actual in￿ ation and it is the interest rate. D1;:::;D3 are dummy
variables. D1 equals 1 when yt￿1 > 0:1 and ￿yt￿1 > 0 and is 0 otherwise; D2 equals 1 when
yt￿1 < 0:1 and ￿yt￿1 < 0 and is 0 otherwise; while D3 equals 1 when D1 = 0 and D2 = 0
jointly and is 0 otherwise. sd
j
t￿1 is standard deviation of in￿ ation up to period t ￿ 1 for group
j. DL equals 1 when in￿ ation is below the target and 0 otherwise, while DH equals 1 when
in￿ ation is above its target and 0 otherwise.
xk
t : all treat:A treat:B
sipk
tjt￿1 2.3985￿￿￿ 2.3578￿￿￿ 2.9678￿￿￿
(0.2340) (0.3620) (0.4567)
D1yt￿1 -0.8720￿￿￿ -1.1590￿￿￿ -0.7103￿￿￿
(0.2117) (0.4328) (0.2137)
D2yt￿1 1.3565￿￿￿ 1.9346￿￿￿ 1.4602￿￿￿
(0.2304) (0.5309) (0.2439)
D3yt￿1 0.3092￿ 0.3000 0.2717
(0.1684) (0.3153) (0.2023)
DLj￿t￿1j 0.2179￿￿ 0.0933 0.3218￿
(0.0948) (0.5938) (0.1856)
DHj￿t￿1j 0.5955￿￿￿ 1.2236￿￿ 0.5659￿￿￿
(0.1344) (0.4821) (0.1497)




t￿1 -1.4642￿￿￿ -0.8690￿ -1.8730￿￿￿
(0.2722) (0.4525) (0.4803)
N 14628 4968 9660
Wald ￿2
(8) 168.4 230.0 122.9
Table 4: Forecasiting accuracy and con￿dence intervals. Note: Coe¢ cients are based on ￿xed ef-
fects logit estimations. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrap procedures
(1000 replications) that take into account potential presence of clusters in groups. */**/***
denotes signi￿cance at 10/5/1 percent level.
The results for ￿xed e⁄ects logit estimation are reported in Table 4 while for Poisson ￿xed
24Frequencies of forecast errors depending on in￿ ation cycle can be found in the Table A2 in Appendix A.Uncertainty and Disagreement in Forecasting Inflation 15
e⁄ects and random e⁄ects are reported in Tables B1-B3 in Appendix B. As one would expect,
when there is higher volatility of in￿ ation there are more outcomes outside the interval, especially
in treatment B. This is well documented in psychology literature as greater volatility leads
to overcon￿dence (e.g. Lawrence and Makridakis, 1989, Lawrence and O￿ Connor, 1992),25
however some studies ￿nd also that there is no such e⁄ect (Du and Budescu, 2007). In both
treatments wider con￿dence intervals result in a higher probability of correctly specifying the
con￿dence interval. Interestingly, we can observe that there exists some pattern across business
cycles. There are more outcomes outside the interval, when the output gap is positive and
has a clear upward trend of in￿ ation, while in the opposite situation there is lower probability
of misperceiving in￿ ation uncertainty. In￿ ation also has a signi￿cant positive impact on the
likelihood of the forecast falling within the interval, especially when in￿ ation is above the target
value.26
3.2. Determinants of Individual Uncertainty. Below we analyze the determinants of
con￿dence bounds using panel data. All regressions below are estimated using system GMM
estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) for dynamic panel data. They are replicated for the
whole sample (all), treatment A (treat:A), and separately for part of the interval below the
point forecast (treat:B￿L) and above the point forecast (treat:B￿U) in treatment B. In order
to transform the asymmetric con￿dence intervals into a measure comparable to the symmetric
ones, we compute the average of the upper and lower interval.
We begin by detailing the relationship between con￿dence interval and standard deviation
of in￿ ation. We estimate the following regression:
sipk





where the individual k￿ s current perceived uncertainty in period t, is measured by her con￿dence
interval, sipk
t+1jt. Results are reported in Table 5.
We ￿nd that con￿dence intervals are highly inertial. This has been previously documented
in Bruine de Bruin, Manski, Topa, and van der Klaauw (2011), and Giordani and S￿derlind
(2003). Higher standard deviation of in￿ ation leads to wider con￿dence intervals, however with
a smaller e⁄ect in treatment A. Du and Budescu (2007) ￿nd no relationship between these
variables. Positive correlation between the self-reported range of responses and underlying
uncertainty is also found for survey data in Bruine de Bruin, Manski, Topa, and van der Klaauw
(2011).27
A second feature of the con￿dence intervals that we want to study is the subjects￿ re-
sponses to in￿ ation falling outside the con￿dence interval. To discriminate between the e⁄ects
25Psychologists argue that this overcon￿dence is due to hard-easy e⁄ects, i.e. miscalibration (reported narrower
con￿dence intervals) is higher in hard tasks and attenuated or even eliminated in easy tasks (e.g. Keren, 1991).





t+1jt ￿ ￿t+1, and the con￿dence interval as a measure of uncertainty.
27We also study the relationship between con￿dence intervals and in￿ ation forecasts as in Rich and Tracy
(2010). They ￿nd mixed evidence of the existence of this relationship, while we do not ￿nd any evidence in favor
of this relationship. These results are available unpon request from the authors.16 D. Pfajfar and B. ￿ Zakelj
sipk
t+1jt : all treat:A treat:B ￿ L treat:B ￿ U
sipk
tjt￿1 0.4390￿￿￿ 0.5445￿￿￿ 0.4407￿￿￿ 0.0925
(0.1114) (0.0921) (0.0485) (0.0982)
sd
j
t￿1 0.1167￿￿￿ 0.0955￿￿ 0.1357￿￿￿ 0.2643￿￿￿
(0.0450) (0.0401) (0.0220) (0.0561)
￿ 0.2143￿￿￿ 0.2039￿￿￿ 0.1142￿￿￿ 0.1884￿￿￿
(0.0283) (0.0285) (0.0187) (0.0323)
N 14904 9936 4968 4968
Wald ￿2
(3) 140.9 259.1 346.1 34.6
Table 5: Con￿dence intervals and standard deviation of in￿ ation. Note: Coe¢ cients are based
on the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated
using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account potential presence of
clusters in groups. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at 10/5/1 percent level.
of overshooting and undershooting we introduce two dummy variables. Dk












, and 0 otherwise. Note that rk
t￿1 = ￿t￿1 ￿ ￿k
t￿1jt￿2 is subject
k￿ s last observed forecast error. Dk
5 equals 1 if
￿￿ ￿rk
t￿1








, and 0 otherwise,
while Dk






t￿1, and 0 otherwise. Therefore Dk
4 = 1 when subject k is
underestimating in￿ ation; while Dk
5 = 1 when subject k is overestimating in￿ ation. We run the
following regression:
sipk










t+1jt : all treat:A treat:B ￿ L treat:B ￿ U
sipk
tjt￿1 0.4430￿￿￿ 0.5496￿￿￿ 0.4641￿￿￿ 0.1068
(0.1080) (0.0865) (0.0491) (0.1059)
D4rk
t￿1 0.0363￿￿ 0.0292￿￿ 0.0023 0.0669￿
(0.0153) (0.0147) (0.0228) (0.0343)
D5rk
t￿1 -0.0760￿￿￿ -0.0647￿￿￿ -0.0955￿￿￿ -0.0668￿￿
(0.0193) (0.0190) (0.0094) (0.0269)
D6rk
t￿1 0.0015 0.0025 -0.0191￿ 0.0506
(0.0201) (0.0204) (0.0107) (0.0309)
￿ 0.2799￿￿￿ 0.2568￿￿￿ 0.1882￿￿￿ 0.3504￿￿￿
(0.0396) (0.0416) (0.0251) (0.0406)
N 14688 9792 4896 4896
Wald ￿2
(5) 203.6 248.5 1048.1 19.7
Table 6: Con￿dence intervals and phases of economic cycle. Note: treat:B ￿ L (treat:B ￿ U)
only includes part of the interval beneath (above) the point forecast. Coe¢ cients are based on
the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated using
bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account potential presence of clusters
in groups. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at 10/5/1 percent level.Uncertainty and Disagreement in Forecasting Inflation 17
Results shown in Table 6 suggest that subjects increased their con￿dence intervals after the
last observed in￿ ation was outside the interval.28 This holds for both "undershooting" and
"overshooting." In the latter rk
t￿1 is negative, so negative coe¢ cient ￿ implies that con￿dence






t￿1. Positive or negative errors do not result in any
signi￿cant change of con￿dence intervals in the next period when in￿ ation falls within the
interval. It is also interesting to note that con￿dence intervals in the treatment B exhibit less
inertia, especially the upper bound, compared to the treatment A. Moreover, the interval above
point forecast widens with both overshooting and undershooting while the interval below is
more stable and responds only to undershooting. This also represents the ￿rst potential source
of observed asymmetries. Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2010) also note that there is a
di⁄erence regarding the formation of the upper and the lower bound of con￿dence intervals.
They argue that lower forecast bounds are signi￿cantly a⁄ected by the past return while upper
are not.
Several studies have established that there are signi￿cant variations in uncertainty over
the business cycles; in particular, uncertainty is found to be countercyclical. Bloom (2009)
and Bloom, Floetotto, and Jaimovich (2010) build theoretical models where uncertainty shocks
exert a key role in the business cycle ￿ uctuations. We estimate equation (8), where we control
for the path of output gap. In addition, speci￿cation (8) also allows for the possibility that
subjects change their interval forecasts on the basis of their last point forecast errors:
sipk
t+1jt = ￿ + ￿sipk
tjt￿1 + ￿D1yt￿1 + ￿D2yt￿1 + ￿D3yt￿1 (8)





￿ ￿ + #T2 + ￿T3 + ￿T4 + uem
t ;
where yt is output gap, it is the interest rate, and D1;:::;D3 are dummy variables as identi￿ed
in equation (14). Estimation results are in the Table 7. T2, T3 and T4 are treatment dummies.29
Friedman (1968) points that there is a positive link between in￿ ation and in￿ ation uncer-
tainty. While Liu and Lahiri (2006) and D￿ Amico and Orphanides (2008) ￿nd empirical support
for this conjecture, we cannot con￿rm it in our experiment. Regressing equation (8) with in￿ a-
tion (￿t￿1) instead of DL j￿t￿1j and DH j￿t￿1j would result in in￿ ation having a negative impact
on the width of con￿dence interval. The empirical studies that ￿nd a positive correlation be-
tween in￿ ation and uncertainty are based on the US economy where, especially in the 70s, there
was mostly an upward risk for in￿ ation. In our experiment, in￿ ation ￿ uctuates around the in￿ a-
tion target, so also decreases of in￿ ation below the in￿ ation target increase uncertainty. With
speci￿cation (8) we concentrate on the absolute deviations of in￿ ation from in￿ ation target,
while controlling for high and low in￿ ation levels. We indeed observe that downside risk has an
even more important impact on the uncertainty than the upside risk. Moreover, being above
the target in￿ ation only the upper part of the con￿dence interval will be widened, whereas being
28Table B6 in Appendix B reports regression with dummies without interaction with actual forecast errors.
29Treatment dummies are included only into regression all as in other speci￿cations due to too few observations
within one treatment we would have to abolish clustering of standard errors if we were to include treatment
dummies.18 D. Pfajfar and B. ￿ Zakelj
sipk
t+1jt : all treat:A treat:B ￿ L treat:B ￿ U
sipk
tjt￿1 0.3976￿￿￿ 0.5333￿￿￿ 0.4305￿￿￿ 0.0900
(0.1034) (0.0990) (0.0398) (0.0997)
D1yt￿1 0.0067 0.0198 0.0202 -0.0560
(0.0219) (0.0258) (0.0252) (0.0465)
D2yt￿1 -0.0188 -0.0118 -0.0144 -0.0650￿￿
(0.0225) (0.0217) (0.0304) (0.0262)
D3yt￿1 0.0067 0.0183 0.0051 -0.1142￿￿￿
(0.0296) (0.0271) (0.0183) (0.0413)
it￿1 0.0110 0.0070 -0.0066 0.0025
(0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0059) (0.0157)
DLj￿t￿1j 0.0294￿￿ 0.0241￿￿ 0.0247￿￿ 0.0782￿￿￿
(0.0115) (0.0105) (0.0108) (0.0234)
DHj￿t￿1j 0.0180 0.0173 0.0668￿￿￿ 0.0248
(0.0167) (0.0135) (0.0139) (0.0310)
jrk
t￿1j 0.0552￿￿￿ 0.0473￿￿￿ 0.0474￿￿ 0.0749￿￿￿







￿ 0.2790 0.2062￿￿￿ 0.1694￿￿￿ 0.2898￿￿￿
(0.2893) (0.0415) (0.0266) (0.0541)
N 14688 9792 4896 4896
Wald ￿2
(12) 393.8 715.8 865.0 145.0
Table 7: Con￿dence intervals and macroeconomic variables. Note: treat:B ￿ L (treat:B ￿ U)
only includes part of the interval beneath (above) the point forecast. Coe¢ cients are based on
the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated using
bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account potential presence of clusters
in groups. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at 10/5/1 percent level.
below the target in￿ ation both sides of the con￿dence interval will be widened.
Interest rates are positively related to the individual con￿dence intervals in the regressions
above, however their e⁄ects are not signi￿cant. Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) point out that
uncertainty about in￿ ation and interest rates can be either positively or negatively related in the
￿eld, however for their sample they ￿nd a negative relationship. Giordani and S￿derlind (2003)
additionally argue that the forecast uncertainty is positively related to the forecast errors. In
Table 7 we also demonstrate that con￿dence intervals depend on the last observed absolute
forecast error.30
30Bruine de Bruin, Manski, Topa, and van der Klaauw (2011) also point out that individual uncertainty is
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Above regressions con￿rm the asymmetries between the upper and lower con￿dence bound
demonstrated in Table 2. We can argue that the upper bound is more sensitive to the stage of
the business cycle than the lower bound. In addition, di⁄erent monetary policy rules also have
an e⁄ect on the width of the con￿dence interval. The con￿dence intervals are wider for example
in treatment 2 compared to the other treatments. One reason behind this is that uncertainty
is related to the variability of in￿ ation which in turn depends on ￿ and more generally on the
monetary policy (see Pfajfar and ￿ Zakelj, 2011).31 However, there also exist other treatment
e⁄ects as can be observed when controlling for a standard deviation of in￿ ation. Table B5 in
Appendix B demonstrates that if we include treatment dummies to regression (6) we ￿nd that
dummy variable for treatment 2 is signi￿cant.
3.3. Which factors a⁄ect the choice of (a)symmetric con￿dence intervals?. So far
we have found several asymmetries between the formation of the upper and the lower con￿dence
bounds. In this section we analyze the choice of asymmetric con￿dence interval by using data
from treatment B. Let us ￿rst analyze a proportion of subjects that systematically chose either
a wider interval above the point forecast as compared to the one below point forecast or vice-
versa. It is clear from Table 8 that when subjects are given an option to insert an asymmetric
con￿dence interval they often do so, especially in treatments 1 and 2. Moreover, among more
than 40% of subjects who systematically insert asymmetric intervals, there are fewer than 6%
that perceive higher uncertainty on the left hand side of their point forecast. We can also
observe that the proportion of subjects inserting symmetric intervals is the highest in treatment
4. Table 8 shows that the behavior of subjects in the in￿ ation targeting treatment is more in
line with theory than in treatments with in￿ ation forecast targeting.
Lower vs. upper (% of subjects) CL < CU CL ￿ CU CL > CU
1 ￿Forward looking (3), ￿ = 1:5 44.4 50.0 5.6
2 ￿Forward looking (3), ￿ = 1:35 50.0 44.4 5.6
3 ￿Forward looking (3), ￿ = 4 33.3 66.7 0.0
4 ￿Contemporaneous (4), ￿ = 1:5 16.7 72.2 11.1
All 36.1 58.3 5.6
Table 8: Proportions of subjects from Treatment B, depending on the di⁄erence between their
upper (CU) and lower (CL) con￿dence intervals. When CL < CU, subject inserted on average a
smaller lower interval than upper interval. Based on pairwise t-test with 5% signi¢ cance level.
Now we turn our attention to the factors that determine the probability of the asymmetric
interval. We ￿rst de￿ne D7 = 1 if the upper interval has exactly the same width as the lower
one and 0 otherwise. There are only about 12:5% of these cases. We observe, however, that 84%
of the subjects inserted their responses with one or two decimal points accuracy. It is therefore
reasonable to de￿ne symmetry also as jCL ￿ CUj ￿ 0:1; in this case we set D8 = 1.32 According
31Due to the presence of heterogeneous expectations this relationship is not monotonic. It is found that the
relationship between ￿ and variability of in￿ ation is U-shaped (see Pfajfar and ￿ Zakelj, 2011 for further details).
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to this de￿nition 47:2% of our responses in treatment B are approximately symmetric. We
estimate the following regressions:
Dz = ￿ + ￿sipk
tjt￿1 + ￿D1yt￿1 + ￿D2yt￿1 + ￿D3yt￿1 + ￿it￿1 (9)
+￿DL j￿t￿1j + ￿DH j￿t￿1j + ￿sd
j
t￿1 + uem
t ; z 2 f7;8g:
Results for logit ￿xed e⁄ects estimator are reported in the ￿rst two columns of Table 9 while
Poisson and logit random e⁄ects estimations can be found in Tables B8 and B9 in Appendix B.
While the above regressions inform us about the likelihood that subjects would insert symmetric
intervals, they are not suitable for measuring the magnitude of the asymmetry of the individual
forecast distributions and its direction. For that purpose it is convenient to introduce a new
variable, skewness, similar to that used in Du and Budescu (2007). We de￿ne the skewness
variable, skwk
t by subtracting the point forecast from the midpoint of the con￿dence interval.
If skwk
t is smaller (greater) than 0, then the interval is left (right) skewed, and the con￿dence
interval below point forecast is wider (narrower) than the one above. If skwk
t = 0 then the
interval is symmetric. Factors a⁄ecting skewness are analyzed on the right side of Table 9 using
the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator.
skwk
t = ￿ + ￿skwk
t￿1 + ￿sipk
tjt￿1 + ￿D1yt￿1 + ￿D2yt￿1 + ￿D3yt￿1 (10)




Regressions for D7 and D8 demonstrate that some indicators of cycle are signi￿cant. In
particular for D7 when the output gap is negative and downward sloping it is less likely to
observe symmetric intervals while for D8 it is more likely to observe symmetrical intervals in
the opposite stages of the business cycle. For both regressions interest rate exerts a signi￿cantly
positive impact and absolute in￿ ation above the target a signi￿cantly negative impact, i.e. there
is less symmetry when in￿ ation is low.
Skewness measure, on the other hand, gives us also an indication of direction of the asym-
metry. We ￿nd that this measure is inertial and tends to decrease (left skewness) when the
previous con￿dence interval was larger. The measure also varies across the business cycles; it
is lower when D3 = 1. Du and Budescu (2007) ￿nd a negative relationship between standard
deviation of in￿ ation and skewness of con￿dence distribution, while we ￿nd this relationship
only for the case of D7.
4. Disagreement and aggregate expectation distribution
Di⁄erent measures can be used to proxy in￿ ation variability. We ￿rst analyze the features of
the standard deviation of point forecasts. Second we take account of individual uncertainty
as well. We de￿ne probability density functions of individual distributions, add them up and
analyze the features of aggregate distribution.
Variance of a point forecasts is a "natural" measure of disagreement. It is often used in





t￿1 - - 0.2861￿￿￿
(0.0576)
sipk
tjt￿1 0.2498 -0.7167 -0.2375￿￿￿
(0.1643) (0.5136) (0.0852)
D1yt￿1 0.3345 0.4867￿￿ -0.0496
(0.4229) (0.2048) (0.0415)
D2yt￿1 -0.4418￿￿ 0.1259 -0.0447
(0.2093) (0.2308) (0.0337)
D3yt￿1 -0.3388 0.1152￿￿￿ -0.0776￿￿￿
(0.2504) (0.0420) (0.0240)
it￿1 0.2547￿ 0.2111￿￿￿ 0.0004
(0.1306) (0.0684) (0.0150)
DLj￿t￿1j 0.1828 0.1802 0.0273
(0.2757) (0.1174) (0.0275)
DHj￿t￿1j -0.4488￿ -0.2613￿￿ -0.0126
(0.2550) (0.1177) (0.0232)
sdk
t￿1 -0.3237￿￿ -0.5066 -0.0050
(0.1510) (0.3272) (0.0498)
￿ - - 0.1037￿￿
(0.0519)
N 4968 4968 4968
Wald ￿2
(8;9) 79.3 58.3 156.3
Table 9: Determinants of symmetric and skewed intervals. Note: Coe¢ cients for the symmetry
tests are based on ￿xed e⁄ects logit estimations, while coe¢ cients for skewness are based on
the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated using
bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account potential presence of clusters
in groups. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at 10/5/1 percent level.
the empirical literature since the data on point forecasts are more frequently available than the
data on individual distributions. It is studied for example in Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987)
and Giordani and S￿derlind (2003). We investigate the relation of standard deviation of point
forecasts to the phases of economic cycle, interest rate, in￿ ation and the mean forecast error:
sdv
j
t+1jt = ￿ + ￿sdv
j
tjt￿1 + ￿D1yt￿1 + ￿D2yt￿1 + ￿D3yt￿1 (11)






t+1jt is a cross-sectional standard deviation of point forecasts in a group j at period
t, while mean absolute forecast error in a group j at period t ￿ 1 is mr
j
t￿1.
Regressions based on (11) are displayed on the left side of Table 10. Standard deviation of22 D. Pfajfar and B. ￿ Zakelj
point forecasts exhibits sensitivity to in￿ ation, mean absolute forecast error and to some degree
business cycles. However it tends to be less sensitive to these variables in the treatment with
asymmetric con￿dence intervals, where we can observe only inertia and sensitivity to business
cycles. Disagreement increases when output gap is below the steady state and falling. We
observe higher disagreement when absolute in￿ ation is below the target. Rich and Tracy (2010)
and D￿ Amico and Orphanides (2008) ￿nd that there is a positive relationship between in￿ ation
and disagreement. Our results conversely point out that also low in￿ ation can generate higher
uncertainty.
There are some treatment di⁄erences regarding the determination of standard deviation
of point forecast (sdv). In particular, treatment 3 seems to produce lower sdv compared to
treatment 1. However, we are not able to introduce treatment dummies to the regressions for
the sdv and IQR as then we would not be able to compute clustered standard errors across
treatments. The results in this paragraph are from estimations of eq. (11) with treatment
dummies using robust standard errors.
4.1. Dispersion of aggregate distribution. Several central banks have started to put
the data from distribution of in￿ ation expectations on the agenda for policy meetings. This is
partly a product of advances in Bayesian estimation methods for monetary models and also the
adoption of new communication strategies by many central banks. Thus, it is often desirable to
aggregate individual distributions and analyze them, rather than calculating averages from the
individual moments. Frequently, only aggregate distributions are available from survey data,
assuming that di⁄erent samples of forecasters have similar aggregate properties to the whole
population.
We derive the distribution from the asymmetric con￿dence bounds using a triangles approach
similar to Engelberg, Manski, and Williams (2009). The mode is set to be equal to point forecast,
while 95% of the derived triangular distribution is set to be between the lower and the upper
con￿dence bound. This way we generate probability density functions for each forecast of an
individual. Distributions are then aggregated (cross sectionally) across individuals in a group.
We choose interquartile range (IQR)33 as it is less sensitive to small variations in tails of the
estimated density compared to cross sectional standard deviation of the aggregate distribution
as an appropriate measure.34 Nevertheless, it is useful to show that the variance of aggregate
distribution is related to the two measures that we study above. Boero, Smith, and Wallis
(2008) show explicitly that the variance of the aggregate distribution can be decomposed into the
average individual uncertainty and disagreement of point forecasts. To discover the properties
of aggregate distribution, we run the following regression:
IQR
j
t = ￿ + ￿IQR
j
t￿1 + ￿D1yt￿1 + ￿D2yt￿1 + ￿D3yt￿1 (12)




33The interquartile range is a range between the 25
th and 75
th percentile.
34Giordani and S￿derlind (2003) use a similar measure to ours. In the literature also other measures were
proposed. Boero, Smith, and Wallis (2008) use standard deviation of the aggregate distribution, while Batchelor
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sdv
j




tjt￿1 0.4982￿￿￿ 0.4738￿￿￿ 0.6280￿￿￿
(0.0896) (0.0787) (0.0670)
D1yt￿1 -0.0171 0.0122 0.0157 -0.0298 -0.0282 0.0385
(0.0154) (0.0168) (0.0376) (0.0622) (0.0854) (0.0582)
D2yt￿1 0.0026 0.0136 -0.1275￿￿￿ -0.0809 -0.0713 -0.1122￿￿
(0.0311) (0.0250) (0.0164) (0.0492) (0.0572) (0.0475)
D3yt￿1 0.0392 0.0520 -0.0249 0.0848 0.1073 -0.0538
(0.0593) (0.0749) (0.0369) (0.0841) (0.1000) (0.0402)
it￿1 0.0279 0.0249 -0.0002 0.0083 0.0076 0.0109
(0.0330) (0.0288) (0.0389) (0.0131) (0.0210) (0.0246)
DLj￿t￿1j 0.1430￿￿￿ 0.1533￿￿￿ 0.0773 0.0758￿￿ 0.0789￿￿￿ 0.0497
(0.0507) (0.0353) (0.0534) (0.0294) (0.0286) (0.0345)
DHj￿t￿1j 0.0787 0.0901 0.0794 0.0438 0.0492 0.0022
(0.0717) (0.0701) (0.0675) (0.0530) (0.0615) (0.0401)
mr
j
t￿1 0.2211￿￿￿ 0.2447￿￿￿ 0.0704 0.2174￿￿￿ 0.2438￿￿￿ 0.0790
(0.0297) (0.0169) (0.0779) (0.0348) (0.0184) (0.0959)
￿ -0.0218 -0.0252 0.0332 0.0739￿￿ 0.0836 0.0668
(0.0911) (0.0726) (0.1211) (0.0308) (0.0610) (0.0750)
N 1632 1088 544 1632 1088 544
Wald ￿2
(8) 3763.3 12747.1 5495.4 19215.1 15228.4 3032.3
Table 10: Analysis of Disagreement: Interquartile Range (left) and Standard Deviation of Point
Forecasts (right). Note: Coe¢ cients are based on the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator.
Standard errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications)
that take into account potential presence of clusters in treatments. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance
at 10/5/1 percent level.
where IQRj = Q3 ￿ Q1 is interquartile range, yt is output gap, it is the interest rate, and
D1;:::;D3 are dummy variables as identi￿ed above.
Equation (12) considers sources of divergences in expectations, such as output gap, interest
rate or previous value of the interquartile range. As above we introduce a dummy variable for
each of the phases of the cycle. Several studies observe considerable inertia in disagreement
of expectations (see Giordani and S￿derlind, 2003), therefore we also include previous period
interquartile range among independent variables and ￿nd them highly signi￿cant. Results on the
right part of Table 10 show that there is some in￿ uence of the cyclical phase and in￿ ation on the
interquartile range. For a negative and decreasing output gap there is more disagreement. This
is similar to the results in survey data, where it is common to observe countercyclical behavior of
variance of in￿ ation expectations.35 We observe that interquartile range is positively correlated
35Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) also study kurtosis and skewness of the distribution of forecasts and ￿nd that
both exhibit procyclical behavior.24 D. Pfajfar and B. ￿ Zakelj
with the absolute level in￿ ation when in￿ ation is below the target level. In treatment A, mean
absolute forecast error also signi￿cantly a⁄ects the IQR. It is worth noting that regressions for
the treatments with symmetric and asymmetric con￿dence intervals show very similar results.
Regression results yield no signi￿cant di⁄erences between the di⁄erent monetary policy rules
employed.
5. Discussion
The aim of this section is to compare di⁄erent measures of individual uncertainty and disagree-
ment among forecasters and to assess their ability to forecast in￿ ation variability. Di⁄erent
studies argue that disagreement measured as standard deviation of point forecasts lacks a the-
oretical basis and therefore is not a suitable proxy for uncertainty and consequently also for
in￿ ation variability as is implicit in Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987). However as we pointed out
above, Boero, Smith, and Wallis (2008) question this statement and show that disagreement is
a component of the variance of aggregate distribution.
There are several advantages and disadvantages to each measure proposed. The choice of
the measure should therefore be oriented to the purpose for which it is intended. Several survey
data articles point out that the advantage of the measure for disagreement among forecasters
(sdv) is that it is available in any survey, whereas only a limited number of surveys asks for
measures of individual uncertainty. A proxy for the uncertainty may be average individual
forecast error variance. Measure of the variance of the aggregate distribution of forecasts gives
information about both, uncertainty and disagreement. Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix A
display a timewise comparison between the average con￿dence interval, standard deviation of
point forecasts and interquartile range for each group.
We compute pairwise correlation coe¢ cients between di⁄erent measures of uncertainty and
disagreement as in D￿ Amico and Orphanides (2008) to compare these di⁄erent measures and to
make a preliminary assessment of their forecast ability which is further scrutinized below using
















t 0.822￿￿￿ 0.532￿￿￿ 1
IQR
j
t 0.827￿￿￿ 0.689￿￿￿ 0.777￿￿￿ 1
￿t+1 -0.080￿￿ -0.030 -0.063￿ -0.131￿￿￿ 1
it+1 0.169￿￿￿ 0.196￿￿￿ 0.226￿￿￿ 0.198￿￿￿ 0.845￿￿￿ 1
yt+1 -0.321￿￿￿ -0.246￿￿￿ -0.259￿￿￿ -0.267￿￿￿ -0.016 -0.177￿￿￿ 1
sd
j
t+1 0.818￿￿￿ 0.690￿￿￿ 0.722￿￿￿ 0.877￿￿￿ -0.143￿￿￿ 0.185￿￿￿ -0.280￿￿￿
Table 11: Pairwise correlation coe￿cients. Note: */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at 10/5/1 per-
cent level.
All three measures that we compare in this section are signi￿cantly positively correlated be-
tween each other and with the standard deviation of in￿ ation. However, some of the correlationUncertainty and Disagreement in Forecasting Inflation 25
coe¢ cients are not very high. As we can observe in Table 11 there is a signi￿cant correlation
coe¢ cient (about 0:5) between the average width of the con￿dence interval and the standard
deviation of point forecasts.36 Rich and Tracy (2010) and Boero, Smith, and Wallis (2008)
￿nd little evidence that this relationship exists in the survey data, while D￿ Amico and Or-
phanides (2008) ￿nd a correlation coe¢ cient of 0:4. Present analysis suggests that uncertainty
and disagreement are modestly correlated.
A positive correlation between interquartile range and individual uncertainty can be ob-
served. Correlation coe¢ cient (around 0:7) is higher than the one studied in the previous
paragraph. As shown in the statistical analysis by Boero, Smith, and Wallis (2008) there exists
a "structural" relationship between these two variables so a positive relationship is expected.
Due to similar reasons there is also a correlation between the disagreement and the interquartile
range. The latter correlation is of similar magnitude to the former one. Therefore one could
argue that interquartile range is in our experiment at least as much, if not more, a measure of
disagreement as average individual uncertainty. Bomberger (1996) argues that standard devia-
tion of point forecasts is a useful proxy for uncertainty and that disagreement tracks uncertainty
better than the GARCH model; however, the latter is questioned by Rich and Butler (1998).37
Policymakers are interested in in￿ ation uncertainty and to obtain its proxies. Therefore the
question that needs to be addressed is which proxy or combination of proxies best forecasts
in￿ ation uncertainty. As we can observe in Table 11 the highest correlation is between the
interquartile range (IQR) and the standard deviation of in￿ ation (sd). It reaches almost 0:9,
while somehow surprisingly disagreement is a slightly better proxy of in￿ ation uncertainty than
average perceived uncertainty of subjects. In order to further assess the forecasting performance
of these measures we estimate the following regression:
sd
j













t￿1 is the average con￿dence interval in period t ￿ 1 for the group k. Table 12
reports the results. We estimate three di⁄erent speci￿cations which are the subset of the above
equation. In the variant (a) we include all three measures, while in the variant (b) we include
only measures of individual uncertainty and disagreement. Variant (c) embeds only IQR as it
is a measure of both individual uncertainty and disagreement and, as pointed out above, it is
the measure that has the highest correlation with standard deviation of in￿ ation.
Regressions con￿rm that the average individual uncertainty and the standard deviation of
point forecasts have a positive e⁄ect on in￿ ation variance. It comes as a surprise however
that interquartile range has a marginally signi￿cant negative e⁄ect. This may be due to a
36Table B4 in Appendix B depicts the relationship between con￿dence bounds and dispersion of point forecasts
in more details. We ￿nd no evidence of this relationship for symmetric intervals while for asymmetric there is a
positive relationship.
37Lahiri and Sheng (2010) point out that disagreement is useful in stable periods for forecasting but not in
periods of high volatility.26 D. Pfajfar and B. ￿ Zakelj
sd
j
t : (a) (b) (c)
sd
j












t￿1 -0.0170￿ - -0.0018
(0.0100) (0.0114)
it￿1 0.0108 0.0108 0.0129
(0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0096)
￿t￿1 -0.0135 -0.0136 -0.0148
(0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0137)
yt￿1 -0.0094￿ -0.0092￿ -0.0125￿￿￿
(0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0037)
￿ -0.0109 -0.0071 0.0169
(0.0227) (0.0218) (0.0178)
N 1656 1656 1656
Wald ￿2
(7;6;5) 54840.3 50525.4 22529.2
Table 12: Factors a⁄ecting the standard deviation of in￿ ation. Note: Coe¢ cients are based on
the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated using
bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account potential presence of clusters
in treatments. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at 10/5/1 percent level.
degree of multicollinearity between IQR and standard deviation of point forecasts and/or mean
con￿dence intervals. In speci￿cation (c) the e⁄ect of IQR is insigni￿cant, while in speci￿cations
(a) and (b) we observe that only average individual con￿dence interval has a positive and highly
signi￿cant e⁄ect on sd. Therefore we can conclude that for forecasting in￿ ation it is most
important to know the average individual con￿dence interval, which is still rarely the case in
surveys of in￿ ation opinions. These regressions con￿rm the results from survey data literature,
as we reach similar conclusions to those of Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987), Boero, Smith, and
Wallis (2008), and Giordani and S￿derlind (2003) who argue that average individual uncertainty
is the proxy of in￿ ation uncertainty that central banks should monitor.
In￿ ation a⁄ects standard deviation of in￿ ation negatively, which might also be surprising.
However, it is likely that if we separated the positive and negative developments of in￿ ation we
would ￿nd similar e⁄ects as in the above regressions for IQR and sdv, i.e. both terms would
enter signi￿cantly positively with negative development having a more profound e⁄ect. Output
gap exerts a negative e⁄ect on sdv.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we design a macroeconomic experiment where subjects are asked to forecast
in￿ ation and its uncertainty. The underlying model of the economy is a simple NK modelUncertainty and Disagreement in Forecasting Inflation 27
which is commonly used for the analysis of monetary policy. The focus is on the analysis of
the con￿dence bounds reported by subjects as a perceived measure of the uncertainty in the
economy. It has been shown that uncertainty has implications for both in￿ ation outcomes
and for unemployment and is an increasingly important indicator for monetary policy making.
Similarly to in￿ ation expectations, the formation of con￿dence bounds is also found to be
heterogeneous. In di⁄erent treatments we focus on various modi￿cations of the original Taylor
rule and study the in￿ uence of di⁄erent monetary policy designs to the formation of con￿dence
bounds. We ￿nd that in￿ ation targeting produces lower uncertainty and higher accuracy of
intervals than in￿ ation forecast targeting. Also the treatment that reacts strongly to deviations
of in￿ ation expectations from the in￿ ation target produces similar e⁄ects as stated above,
compared to treatments that do not react as strongly to deviations of in￿ ation forecasts. This
e⁄ect does not only channel through the variability of in￿ ation, but there is evidence that there
are additional e⁄ects.38
Subjects on average underestimate risk. This is a standard result in the psychology literature
and is known as overcon￿dence bias. We ￿nd that subjects only in 60:5% of cases correctly
estimate risk. In particular, less than 10% of subjects on average report con￿dence bounds
that represent approximately the 95% con￿dence intervals consistent with actual realizations;
around 10% overestimate risk, while all others underestimate risk. We observe more cases of
in￿ ation falling outside the con￿dence interval when volatility of in￿ ation is higher and when
con￿dence intervals are narrower. Outcomes outside the interval are also more frequent when
output gap is lower and has a downward trend, while in the opposite situation there is lower
probability of misperceiving in￿ ation uncertainty.
We also analyze measures of individual uncertainty, disagreement among forecasters and
properties of aggregate distribution. All these measures are related as argued in Boero, Smith,
and Wallis (2008), however they have very di⁄erent features. Interquartile range is a measure of
both uncertainty and disagreement. We ￿rst analyze the formation of con￿dence intervals. We
￿nd that con￿dence intervals are positively related to in￿ ation variability, that they are highly
inertial and that widen after an "error." It is also interesting to observe the relation between
in￿ ation and con￿dence intervals. In the survey data literature it has been established that these
two variables are positively related, i.e. higher in￿ ation is causing wider con￿dence intervals.
Below target in￿ ation also causes the interval to increase and that absolute deviations from
in￿ ation target is an appropriate variable to take into account. Furthermore, we can establish
some facts about the di⁄erences between the formation of lower and upper bounds. In particular,
we ￿nd that the upper bound is more sensitive to the stage of the business cycle while the lower
bound exhibit signi￿cantly more inertia.
More generally, we also study the determinants of the choice of asymmetric interval. In our
treatment B subjects have the possibility to insert an asymmetric con￿dence interval, while in
treatment A they are restricted to symmetric intervals. We ￿nd that there are only about 12:5%
of cases when subjects insert symmetric intervals when they have the possibility of inserting
38Pfajfar and ￿ Zakelj (2011) show that variability of in￿ ation in this experiment depends on monetary policy
rules.28 D. Pfajfar and B. ￿ Zakelj
an asymmetric interval. Moreover, in treatment B more than 35% of subjects report higher
upper bounds than the lower ones, while there are only about 5% of subjects with the opposite
pattern. It is more likely to observe symmetric intervals when the interest rate is high and less
likely when in￿ ation is below the target. Symmetric intervals are also more common when the
output gap is positive and rising compared to the opposite stage of the business cycle.
What determines the evolution of standard deviation of point forecasts and the interquartile
range of the aggregate distribution? We document that IQR is more inertial than sdv while they
both increase when in￿ ation is below the target level. We also compare forecasting performance
of these measures and observe that the interquartile range of the aggregate distribution is the one
that has the highest correlation with the actual uncertainty. Nevertheless, regression analysis
suggests that the average individual con￿dence interval is the only measure that consistently
enters signi￿cantly in our forecasting speci￿cations. Therefore, we con￿rm previous results from
the survey data literature that more central banks should design their surveys in order that each
individual provides their whole distribution of forecasts or at least some measure of uncertainty
of their forecasts. In this sense it might be enough if they are asked for their con￿dence intervals
as in our treatment A. Generally, this would greatly enhance the informativeness of these surveys
as central banks would also receive a proxy for forecasting in￿ ation uncertainty.Uncertainty and Disagreement in Forecasting Inflation 29
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Con￿dence bound
Symmetric Lower Upper
Treat Group < ￿ > < ￿ > < ￿ >
1-A 1 100 0 0 - - - - - -
1-A 2 78 11 11 - - - - - -
1-A 3 89 11 0 - - - - - -
1-A 4 78 22 0 - - - - - -
1-B 5 - - - 89 11 0 0 22 78
1-B 6 - - - 100 0 0 0 11 89
2-A 7 44 11 44 - - - - - -
2-A 8 78 11 11 - - - - - -
2-A 9 100 0 0 - - - - - -
2-A 10 100 0 0 - - - - - -
2-B 11 - - - 100 0 0 0 0 100
2-B 12 - - - 100 0 0 0 0 100
3-A 13 56 22 22 - - - - - -
3-A 14 89 11 0 - - - - - -
3-A 15 56 11 33 - - - - - -
3-A 16 100 0 0 - - - - - -
3-B 17 - - - 100 0 0 0 0 100
3-B 18 - - - 100 0 0 0 11 89
4-A 19 78 11 11 - - - - - -
4-A 20 89 11 0 - - - - - -
4-A 21 67 0 33 - - - - - -
4-A 22 78 11 11 - - - - - -
4-B 23 - - - 78 0 22 11 11 78
4-B 24 - - - 100 0 0 0 11 89
All 80 9 11 96 1 3 1 8 90
Table A1: Percentage of subjects by group with underprediction/overprediction of con￿dence
interval. Note: The benchmark con￿dence level is 1:96 ￿ sdk
t￿1. < (>) identi￿es frequencies of
subjects whose inputs are signi¢ cantly lower (higher) than the benchmark value. ￿ identi￿es
subjects whose input is not siggni￿cantly di⁄erent from the benchmark. Based on t-tests.
All Treatment A Treatment B
In￿ ation " # ￿ " # ￿ " # ￿
Underprediction 34.63 3.98 17.83 30.93 4.12 16.79 41.39 3.69 20.02
Inside interval 60.65 58.41 63.95 64.81 62.75 66.43 53.03 49.15 58.76
Overprediction 4.72 37.6 18.22 4.25 33.13 16.79 5.58 47.17 21.22
Table A2: Interval correctness depending on the phase of the in￿ ation cycle (% of decisions).
" denotes cases when in￿ ation increases for at least 2 last periods, and # denotes cases when it
decreases for at least 2 last periods. ￿ represents all other cases. Subjects "underpredict" when
the actual in￿ ation is larger than subject￿ s predicted upper con￿dence bound; and "overpredict"









































































































0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Group 1A - 1 Group 1A - 2
Group 1A - 3 Group 1A - 4
Group 1B - 5 Group 1B - 6
Group 2A - 1 Group 2A - 2
Group 2A - 3 Group 2A - 4
Group 2B - 5 Group 2B - 6
Average confidence interval Average point forecast

























Figure A1: Average in￿ ation forecasts and average con￿dence intervals (left axis) and
disagreement and uncertainty measures (right axis) per group. Interquartile range is
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Figure A2: Average in￿ ation forecasts and average con￿dence intervals (left axis) and
disagreement and uncertainty measures (right axis) per group. Interquartile range is
calculated from the aggregate expectation distribution as described in Section 4.1.Uncertainty and Disagreement in Forecasting Inflation 37
B. Appendix: Additional Regressions
In Table B7 we estimate the following regression using the system GMM estimator of Blundell
and Bond (1998) for dynamic panel data:
rk




Tables B8 and B9 report results of the following regressions:
Dz = ￿ + ￿sipk
tjt￿1 + ￿D1yt￿1 + ￿D2yt￿1 + ￿D3yt￿1 + ￿it￿1
+￿DL j￿t￿1j + ￿DH j￿t￿1j + ￿sd
j
t￿1 + uem
t ; z 2 f7;8;9g;
where D7 = 1 if the upper interval (CU) has exactly the same width as the lower interval (CL)







Table B8 displays the results of logit estimations, while Table B9 presents the results of Poisson
estimations.
xk
t : all treat.A treat.B
sipk
tjt￿1 0.2989￿￿￿ 0.2260 0.3717￿￿￿
(0.0723) (0.1839) (0.1011)
D1yt￿1 -0.3103￿￿￿ -0.4341￿￿ -0.2719￿￿￿
(0.0759) (0.2061) (0.0870)
D2yt￿1 0.6037￿￿￿ 0.8818￿￿￿ 0.5563￿￿￿
(0.0826) (0.2076) (0.0980)
D3yt￿1 0.0557 0.0553 0.0551
(0.0494) (0.1065) (0.0560)
DLj￿t￿1j 0.1164￿￿￿ 0.0893 0.1184￿￿￿
(0.0256) (0.1862) (0.0369)
DHj￿t￿1j 0.2353￿￿￿ 0.4681￿￿ 0.2035￿￿￿
(0.0457) (0.1872) (0.0485)




t￿1 -0.5094￿￿￿ -0.2835 -0.5434￿￿￿
(0.0778) (0.1782) (0.0980)
N 14904 4968 9936
Wald ￿2
(8) 180.7 110.1 106.7
Table B1: Forecasting accuracy and con￿dence intervals. Note: Table is based on equation
(5). Coe¢ cients are based on ￿xed e⁄ects Poisson estimations. Standard errors in parentheses
are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account potential
presence of clusters in groups. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at 10/5/1 percent level.38 D. Pfajfar and B. ￿ Zakelj
xk
t : all treat.A treat.B
sipk
tjt￿1 2.9756￿￿￿ 3.0827￿￿ 2.9731￿￿￿
(0.6019) (1.2263) (0.7409)
D1yt￿1 -0.8511￿￿￿ -1.0369￿￿ -0.7651￿￿￿
(0.1643) (0.4555) (0.1931)
D2yt￿1 1.5409￿￿￿ 1.8617￿￿￿ 1.5010￿￿￿
(0.2244) (0.4738) (0.2397)
D3yt￿1 0.2866￿ 0.3315 0.2762
(0.1612) (0.2886) (0.1932)
DLj￿t￿1j 0.2753￿￿ 0.1300 0.3216￿
(0.1113) (0.5544) (0.1784)
DHj￿t￿1j 0.6275￿￿￿ 1.0751￿￿ 0.5522￿￿￿
(0.1179) (0.4374) (0.1343)
it￿1 -0.1421￿￿ -0.3303 -0.0927
(0.0699) (0.3517) (0.0718)
sdk
t￿1 -1.8189￿￿￿ -1.3832￿￿ -1.9333￿￿￿
(0.3840) (0.6491) (0.5259)
￿ 0.6642￿￿￿ 0.6659 0.6702￿￿
(0.2467) (1.1317) (0.2871)
ln(￿2
u) -0.7610 -0.7702 -0.6338
(0.2130) (0.4134) (0.2611)
￿u 0.6835 0.6804 0.7284
(0.0728) (0.1406) (0.0951)
￿￿ 0.1244 0.1234 0.1389
(0.0232) (0.0447) (0.0312)
N 14904 4968 9936
Wald ￿2
(8) 215.3 164.1 145.1
Table B2: Forecasting accuracy and con￿dence intervals. Note: Table is based on equation
(5). Coe¢ cients are based on random e⁄ects logit estimations. Standard errors in parentheses
are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account potential
presence of clusters in groups. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at 10/5/1 percent level.Uncertainty and Disagreement in Forecasting Inflation 39
xk
t : all treat.A treat.B
sipk
tjt￿1 0.2712￿￿￿ 0.2414 0.2646￿￿
(0.0649) (0.1704) (0.1103)
D1yt￿1 -0.3258￿￿￿ -0.4259￿￿ -0.3091￿￿￿
(0.0738) (0.1903) (0.0879)
D2yt￿1 0.6062￿￿￿ 0.8427￿￿￿ 0.5633￿￿￿
(0.0827) (0.2259) (0.0994)
D3yt￿1 0.0486 0.0806 0.0372
(0.0477) (0.1113) (0.0545)
DLj￿t￿1j 0.1184￿￿￿ 0.1119 0.1090￿￿￿
(0.0247) (0.1842) (0.0332)
DHj￿t￿1j 0.2209￿￿￿ 0.4061￿￿ 0.1858￿￿￿
(0.0411) (0.1779) (0.0441)




t￿1 -0.5481￿￿￿ -0.5110￿￿￿ -0.5363￿￿￿
(0.0749) (0.1286) (0.0976)
￿ -0.2598￿￿￿ -0.2505 -0.2301￿￿￿
(0.0587) (0.3685) (0.0631)
ln(￿￿) -3.1464 -2.8773 -3.4026
(0.2286) (0.2960) (0.3133)
￿￿ 0.0430 0.0563 0.0333
(0.0098) (0.0167) (0.0104)
N 14904 4968 9936
Wald ￿2
(8) 201.5 67.4 107.7
Table B3: Forecasting accuracy and con￿dence intervals. Note: Table is based on equation (5).
Coe¢ cients are based on random e⁄ects Poisson estimations. Standard errors in parentheses
are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account potential
presence of clusters in groups. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at 10/5/1 percent level.
sipk
t+1jt : all treat:A treat:B ￿ L treat:B ￿ U
sipk
tjt￿1 0.4472￿￿￿ 0.5530￿￿￿ 0.4468￿￿￿ 0.0991
(0.1058) (0.0817) (0.0418) (0.1038)
sdv
j
t￿1 0.1119￿￿ 0.0993￿￿￿ 0.1472￿￿￿ 0.2929￿￿￿
(0.0448) (0.0373) (0.0322) (0.0788)
￿ 0.2596￿￿￿ 0.2356￿￿￿ 0.1665￿￿￿ 0.2902￿￿￿
(0.0366) (0.0360) (0.0277) (0.0300)
N 14904 9936 4968 4968
Wald ￿2
(2) 58.9 129.8 114.6 65.5
Table B4: Con￿dence intervals and standard deviation of point forecasts. Note: Table is based
on equation: sipk




t . Coe¢ cients are based on the Blundell-
Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrap
procedures (1000 replications) that take into account potential presence of clusters in groups.





















Table B5: Con￿dence intervals and standard deviation of in￿ ation Note: Coe¢ cients are based
on the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated
using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account potential presence of
clusters in groups. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at 10/5/1 percent level.
sipk
t+1jt : all treat:A treat:B ￿ L treat:B ￿ U
sipk
tjt￿1 0.4636￿￿￿ 0.5719￿￿￿ 0.4780￿￿￿ 0.1090
(0.1028) (0.0726) (0.0532) (0.1072)
Dk
4 0.0364￿ 0.0228 0.0054 0.0788￿￿
(0.0215) (0.0263) (0.0121) (0.0320)
Dk
5 0.0669￿￿￿ 0.0656￿￿ 0.0735￿￿￿ 0.0261
(0.0233) (0.0295) (0.0216) (0.0264)
￿ 0.2718￿￿￿ 0.2489￿￿￿ 0.1802￿￿￿ 0.3480￿￿￿
(0.0376) (0.0364) (0.0264) (0.0400)
N 14688 9792 4896 4896
Wald ￿2
(3) 59.0 127.2 138.5 14.5
Table B6: Con￿dence intervals and the e⁄ect of forecast errors. Note: Table is based on
equation: sipk




t . Coe¢ cients are based on the Blundell-
Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrap
procedures (1000 replications) that take into account potential presence of clusters in groups.
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rk
t+1 : all treat:A treat:B ￿ L treat:B ￿ U
rk
t 0.6970￿￿￿ 0.6757￿￿￿ 0.8521￿￿￿ 0.8524￿￿￿
(0.1376) (0.1596) (0.0250) (0.0254)
sipk
t+1jt 0.0559 0.0812 0.6387￿￿￿ -0.1139￿
(0.0928) (0.1102) (0.1980) (0.0619)
￿ -0.0211 -0.0401 -0.2016￿￿￿ -0.0076
(0.0513) (0.0651) (0.0468) (0.0299)
N 14688 9792 4896 4896
Wald ￿2
(3) 26.7 21.4 6625.1 4809.6
Table B7: Forecast errors and con￿dence intervals. Note: Coe¢ cients are based on the Blundell-
Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrap
procedures (1000 replications) that take into account potential presence of clusters in groups.
*/**/*** denotes signi￿cance at 10/5/1 percent level.42 D. Pfajfar and B. ￿ Zakelj
logit D7 D8 D9 D9, fe
sipk
tjt￿1 0.2178 -1.0233￿ -0.0194 0.0581
(0.1957) (0.6213) (0.2968) (0.2239)
D1yt￿1 0.2836 0.4825￿￿ -0.0122 -0.0028
(0.4162) (0.2245) (0.2913) (0.2846)
D2yt￿1 -0.3912￿ 0.1116 -0.0490 -0.0605
(0.2058) (0.2339) (0.1847) (0.1859)
D3yt￿1 -0.3436 0.1057￿￿ -0.0277 -0.0288
(0.2645) (0.0441) (0.1667) (0.1508)
DLj￿t￿1j 0.2375￿ 0.2203￿￿￿ 0.1635 0.1629
(0.1354) (0.0720) (0.1163) (0.1143)
DHj￿t￿1j 0.1510 0.1858 0.1494 0.1588
(0.2850) (0.1214) (0.1929) (0.1842)
it￿1 -0.4047 -0.2827￿￿ -0.2041 -0.1969
(0.2570) (0.1204) (0.1660) (0.1637)
sdk
t￿1 -0.1318 -0.4759￿ -0.2817￿￿ -0.3295￿
(0.1381) (0.2477) (0.1330) (0.1905)
￿ -2.8695￿￿￿ -0.1098 -1.5233￿￿￿ -
(0.4649) (0.3313) (0.4104)
ln(￿2
u) -0.4665 -1.1088 -0.7481 -
(0.2516) (0.2653) (0.2443)
￿u 0.7920 0.5744 0.6879 -
(0.0996) (0.0762) (0.0840)
￿￿ 0.1601 0.0911 0.1258 -
(0.0338) (0.0220) (0.0269)
N 4968 4968 4968 4968
Wald ￿2
(8) 48.3 72.3 29.2 34.0
Table B8: Determinants of symmetric intervals. Note: Coe¢ cients are based on random e⁄ects
logit estimations, except for "D9, fe" which is based on ￿xed e⁄ects logit estimation. Standard
errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take
into account potential presence of clusters in groups. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at 10/5/1
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Poisson D7 D8 D9 D9, fe
sipk
tjt￿1 0.1717 -0.7314￿￿ -0.0307 0.0443
(0.1412) (0.3667) (0.2476) (0.1641)
D1yt￿1 0.2215 0.2141￿ -0.0092 0.0032
(0.3388) (0.1165) (0.2046) (0.1989)
D2yt￿1 -0.2974￿ 0.0625 -0.0298 -0.0491
(0.1598) (0.1137) (0.1276) (0.1301)
D3yt￿1 -0.2727 0.0704￿ -0.0106 -0.0147
(0.2216) (0.0392) (0.1234) (0.1050)
DLj￿t￿1j 0.1922￿ 0.1043￿￿ 0.1114 0.1106
(0.1092) (0.0408) (0.0820) (0.0801)
DHj￿t￿1j 0.1141 0.0917 0.1004 0.1146
(0.2330) (0.0759) (0.1411) (0.1353)
it￿1 -0.3303 -0.1336￿￿ -0.1413 -0.1298
(0.2126) (0.0619) (0.1146) (0.1115)
sd
j
t￿1 -0.0802 -0.2374￿￿￿ -0.1933￿￿ -0.2476￿￿
(0.1356) (0.0906) (0.0841) (0.1203)
￿ -2.6585￿￿￿ -0.6834￿￿￿ -1.6007￿￿￿ -
(0.3787) (0.1597) (0.2862)
ln(￿￿) -0.8804￿￿￿ -2.8617￿￿￿ -1.5552￿￿￿ -
(0.2106) (0.9207) (0.2275)
￿￿ 0.4146 0.0572 0.2111 -
(0.0873) (0.0526) (0.0480)
N 4968 4968 4968 4968
Wald ￿2
(8) 40.3 71.3 21.9 27.4
Table B9: Determinants of symmetric intervals. Note: Coe¢ cients are based on random e⁄ects
poisson estimations, except for "D9, fe" which is based on ￿xed e⁄ects logit estimation. Standard
errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into
account potential presence of clusters in groups. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at 10/5/1 percent
level.44 D. Pfajfar and B. ￿ Zakelj
C. Instructions for the Experiment
Thank you for participating in this experiment, a project of economic investigation. Your
earnings depend on your decisions and the decisions of the other participants. There is a show
up fee of 5 Euros assured. From now on until the end of the experiment you are not allowed
to communicate with each other. If you have any questions raise your hand and one of the
instructors will answer the question in private. Please do not ask aloud.
The experiment. All participants receive exactly the same instructions. You and 8 other
subjects all participate as agents in the same ￿ctitious economy. You will have to predict future
values of given economic variables. The experiment consists of 70 periods. The rules are the
same in all the periods. You will interact with the same 8 subjects during the whole experiment.
Imagine that you work in a ￿rm where you have to predict in￿ ation for the next period.
Your earnings depend on the accuracy of your in￿ ation expectation.
Information in each period. The economy will be described with 3 variables in this
experiment: the in￿ ation rate, the output gap, and the interest rate.
￿ In￿ ation measures a general rise in prices in the economy. In each period it depends on
the in￿ ation expectations of the agents in economy (you and the other 8 participants in
this experiment), output gap and random shocks which have equal probability to have
positive or negative e⁄ect on in￿ ation and are normally distributed.
￿ The output gap measures for how much (in percents) the actual Gross Domestic Product
di⁄ers from the potential one. If the output gap is greater than 0, it means that the
economy is producing more than the potential level, if negative, less than the potential
level. It depends in each period on the in￿ ation expectations of the agents in the economy,
past output gap, interest rate and random shocks which have equal probability to have a
positive or negative e⁄ect on in￿ ation and are normally distributed.
￿ The interest rate is (in this experiment) the price of borrowing the money (in percents)
for one period. The interest rate is set by the monetary authority. Their decision mostly
depends on in￿ ation expectations of the agents in the economy.
All given variables might be relevant for in￿ ation forecast, but it is up to you to work
out their relation and possible bene￿t of knowing them. The evolution of variables will partly
depend on the inputs of you and other subjects and also di⁄erent exogenous shocks in￿ uencing
the economy.
￿ You enter the economy in period 1. In this period you will be given computer generated
past values of in￿ ation, output gap and interest rate for 10 periods back (Called: -9, -8,
... -1, 0)
￿ In period 2 you will be given all past values as seen in period 1 plus the value from period
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￿ In period 3 you will see all past values as in period 2 (Periods: -9, -8, ... 1, 2) plus YOUR
prediction about in￿ ation in period 2 that you made in period 1.
￿ In period t you will see all past values of actual in￿ ation up to period t ￿ 1 (Periods: -9,
-8, ... t￿2, t￿1) and your predictions up to period t￿1 (Periods: 2, 3, ... t￿2, t￿1).
What do you have to decide?. Your task is to predict the state of the economy as
accurately as possible. Your payo⁄ will depend on the accuracy of your prediction of the
in￿ ation in the future period. In each period your prediction will consist of two parts:
a) Expected in￿ ation, (in percents) that you expect to be in the NEXT period (Exp:Inf:)
b) Lower bound (in percents) of your prediction. You must be almost sure that the actual
in￿ ation will be higher than your lower bound.
c) Upper bound (in percents) of your prediction. You must be almost sure that the actual
in￿ ation will be smaller than your upper bound.
Based on b) and c) we determine the con￿dence interval, Conf:Int: which is equal to
Conf:Int: = Upper bound ￿ Lower bound
Example 1. Let￿ s say you think that in￿ ation in the next period will be 3:7%. And you also
think there is most likely (95% probability) that the actual in￿ ation will not be lower than 3:2%
and not higher than 4:0%. Your inputs in the experiment will be 3:7 under a), 3:2 under b),
and 4:0 under c).














where Exp:Inf: is your expectation about the in￿ ation in the NEXT period, Conf:Int: is the
con￿dence interval, In￿ ation is the actual in￿ ation in the next period and x is variable with
value 1 if
Lower bound ￿ Inflation ￿ Upper bound
and 0 otherwise.
The ￿rst part of the payo⁄ function states that you will receive some payo⁄ if the actual
value in the next period will di⁄er from your prediction in this period by less than 4 percentage
points. The smaller this di⁄erence is, the higher the payo⁄ you receive. With a zero forecast
error (jInflation ￿ Exp:Inf:j = 0), you would receive 80 units (100=1 ￿ 20). However, if your
forecast is 1 percentage point higher or lower than the actual in￿ ation rate, you will get only
30 units (100=2 ￿ 20). If your forecast error is 4 percentage points or more, you will receive 0
units (100=5 ￿ 20).46 D. Pfajfar and B. ￿ Zakelj
The second part of the payo⁄ function simply states that you will get some extra payo⁄
if the actual in￿ ation is within your expected interval and if that interval is not larger than 8
percentage points. The more certain of the actual value you are, the smaller interval you give
(Lower bound and Upper bound closer to Exp:Inf:), and the higher will be your payo⁄ if the
actual in￿ ation indeed is in the given interval, but there will also be higher chances that actual
value will fall outside your interval. In our example this interval was 0.8 percentage points. If
the actual in￿ ation falls in this interval you would receive 51:4 units (100=(1 + 1
20:8) ￿ 20) in
addition to the payo⁄ from the ￿rst part of the payo⁄ function. If the actual values is outside
your interval, your receive 0.
In the attached sheet you will ￿nd the table showing various combinations of forecast error
and con￿dence interval needed to earn a given number of points.
Information after each period. Your payo⁄ depends on your predictions for the next
periods and actual realization in the next period. Because the actual in￿ ation will be known
only in the next period, you will also be informed about you current period (t) prediction and
earnings after the end of the NEXT period (t + 1). Therefore:
￿ After Period 1 you will not receive any earnings, since you did not make any prediction
for the period 1.
￿ In any other period, you will receive the information about the actual in￿ ation rate in
this period and your in￿ ation and con￿dence interval prediction from the previous period.
You will also be informed if the actual in￿ ation value was in your expected interval and
what your earnings are for this period.
The units in the experiment are ￿ctitious. Your actual payo⁄ (in euros) will be the sum of
earnings from all periods divided by 500.
If you have any questions please ask them now!
Questionnaire39
1. If you believe that in￿ ation in the next period will be _ _4:2%_ _, and you are quite
sure that it will not go down for more than _ _ 0.4_ _ nor up for more than _ _ 0.7_
_, you will type:
Under (1) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ for in￿ ation,
Under (2) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ for the lower bound, and
Under (3) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ for the upper bound.
2. If you are now in period _ _ _ _15_ _ _ _, you have information about past in￿ ation,
output gap and interest rate up to period _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ and you have to predict
the in￿ ation for period _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
39Options (1), (2) and (3) are pointing to the di⁄erent ￿elds on the screenshot of the experimental interface.